This paper analyses a detailed dataset on various aspects of institutions relating to functioning of (a) political institutions and civil society, (b) market for goods and services, (c) capital market, and (d) labour market. Examining the correlations within and across these major aspects of institutions it identifies a set of independent institutional variables that can be regressed on income (GDP per capita) and growth of a large number of less developed countries over the period, 2001-06. We find a strong link (some positive and some negative) between all aspects of institutions considered here and GDP per capita but no link between institutions and growth.
Introduction
Do institutions matter for growth? The pioneering works done by North (1990 North ( , 2005 argued that rich nations have managed to form proper institutions that protect property rights and enforcement contracts while poor countries lack these institutions and so fail to develop. The idea that institutions matter for a proper capitalist development can be traced back to the writings of famous German social scientist, Max Weber. Comparing the experience of industrialising countries of Western Europe with other countries, Weber concluded that a rational legal institution is a precondition for the emergence of capitalism. Some scholars call it 'endowment perspective' because it treats institutions as endowments (created by fixed investment), which determines the path of
The Institutional Variables
The field of institutions covered in the French database has four broad categories: (A) political institutions and civil society, (B) the market for goods and services, (C) the capital market, and (D) the labour market. The questionnaire on which it is based contains 356 basic variables. After first order aggregation (through standard deviation weighted averaging -standard deviation measuring variation of a component across the countries), these variables produce 110 indicators on the state of institutions. The method adapted to construct the indicators is described in Berthelier et al. (2003) and Meisel and Aoudia (2007) .
A detailed analysis of the whole dataset is beyond the scope of the present study. We consider some important aspects. First, consider the broad category A (public institutions, and civil society).
A. Functioning of public institutions and civil society
A large number of variables belong to this category. Each variable is a weighted average of a number of components (weight of a component is its standard deviation measuring variations of that component across the countries). Each component assumes the value in an ordinal scale (explained below) ranging from 1 to 4 (or 0 to 4). Some important variables in this category and their components are discussed below.
First consider the variable, political rights and functioning of political institutions (A100). It has the following components: A1000: Freedom and legality of elections (grade varies from 0 if there is no elections, if election exists, it varies from 1 = little freedom or legality to 4 = high level of freedom and legality). A1001: Acceptance or contestation of most recent change at highest level of government (grade varies from 1 = strong contestation to 4 = substantial acceptance). A1002: Participation of armed forces in political life, de jure or de facto (grade varies from 1 = strong participation to 4 = very weak participation).
Next consider the variable, public freedoms and the autonomy of the civil society (A101). Grades are given under the following formula: 0 if there are no rights guaranteeing these freedoms or their respect -if such rights exist, grade varies from 1 = little guarantee of or respect for freedom of press, assembly, association to 4 = substantial. This variable has following five components (aggregated following the same procedure as in the case of A100):
A1010: Freedom of the press; A1011: Freedom of association; A1012: Freedom of assembly and demonstration; A1013: Respect for law in relations between citizens and the administration; A1014: Respect for minorities (ethnic, religious, linguistic etc.).
The third variable is the concentration of the media (A102). It has two components:
A1020: Proportion of the media under de jure or de facto government control (grade varies from 1 = high proportion to 4 = low proportion); A1021: Degree of concentration of private media -whether a small number of business houses control private media (grade varies from 1 = high concentration to 4 = substantial plurality).
The fourth variable is centralisation -decentralisation: devolution of local authorities A103. It has the following two components and the grade is given according to the following formula: 1 = totally appointed, 2 = majority appointed, 3 = majority elected, 4 = totally elected:
A1030: election of municipal authorities; A1031: election of other local authorities (states in the case of federations, regions, provinces etc.).
The fifth variable is centralisation -decentralisation: autonomy in tax matters (A104). It has the following two components:
A1040: Degree of municipal authorities' autonomy in tax matters (grade varies from 0 in the event of no autonomy in tax matters -if autonomy in tax matters exists, grade varies from 1= very little autonomy to 4 = all local resources are raised locally); A1041: Degree of other local authorities' autonomy in tax matters (states in case of federations, regions, provinces etc.) -0 in the event of no autonomy in tax matters -if autonomy in tax matters exists, grade varies from 1 = very little autonomy to 4= all local resources are raised locally.
The correlation among the broad sub-categories is given by the correlation matrix presented in Table 1 . It shows a high degree of positive correlation between political rights and functioning of political institutions (A100) and public freedom and autonomy of the civil society (A101) which in turn is positively correlated with concentration of private media (A102). Table 1 Coefficients of correlation between various aspects of political institutions and civil society ______________________________________________________ Note: A100: Political rights and functioning of political institutions; A101: Public freedoms and the autonomy of the civil society; A102: Concentration of the media; A103: Centralisation -decentralisation: devolution of local authorities; A104: Centralisation -decentralisation: autonomy in tax matters; A200: Internal public security (A200); A201: External public security (A201); A302: Corruption (A302); A307: Running of the justice system; A5000: Local large corporations and banks; A5002: Foreign large corporations and banks; A5003: Large landowners; A5009: Army and/or security services; A5015: Single political party -de facto.
At a further disaggregated level if we examine the correlation matrix of the components (details are skipped) it can be observed that a high positive correlation exists among freedom and legality of elections (A1000), freedom of press (A1010), freedom of association (A1011), freedom of assembly and demonstration (A1012), low proportion of the media under de jure or de facto government control (A1020) and democracy at municipal level (A1030). The implication is that a country getting high score on account of free and fair elections also gets high score for freedom of press, freedom of association and demonstration. All these institutions go together.
Two important variables mentioned in the above table are internal and external public security. Internal public security (A200) has the following components: A2000: Security of persons and goods (grade varies from 1 = low to 4 = high); A2001: Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature (grade varies from 1 = severe conflicts to 4 = no conflicts); A2002: Violent actions by underground political organisations (grade varies from 1 = major action to 4= no action); A2003: Organised criminal activity (drug-trafficking, arms-trafficking, etc.
(grade varies from 1= substantial activity to 4 = no activity); A2004: Violent social conflicts (grade varies from 1 = extremely violent to 4 = low degree of violence).
External public security (A201), on the other hand, has the following components:
A2010: Military tensions with other countries (grade varies from 1 = major tensions to 4 = no tensions); A2011: Military tensions with the international community (grade varies from 1 = major tensions to 4 = no tensions).
There is a very high and positive correlation between conflicts of ethnic religious or regional nature (A2001) and violent action by underground political institutions (A2002) as can be observed from Table 2 . In each case the grade varies from 1 = widespread to 4 = low level. The correlation between these two types of corruption is found to be very high (0.61).
For the variable, running of the justice system (A307), the following components are considered: A3070: Independence of the justice system from Government; A3071: De facto equality of treatment for foreigners; A3072: Degree of application and speed of rulings.
The grade in each case varies from 1 = low degree of independence, application, rapidity to 4= high degree of independence, satisfactory application. The correlation between the first two components is very high (correlation coefficient is 0.61).
The French dataset also considered the importance of various stakeholders in the political affairs of a country and grades are given in accordance with the following formula: 0 if the stakeholder has no weight and no influence -if the stakeholder has an influence the grade varies from 1 (very little influence) to 4 (a huge amount of influence and weight). Altogether 18 stakeholders are listed; we consider the following stakeholders: local large corporations and banks (A5000), foreign large corporations and banks (A5002), large landowners (A5003), army and/or security services (A5009) and single political party -de facto (A5015). We did not find significant correlation among the components. However, the two stakeholder variables, army etc. (A5009) and de facto single political party (A5015) are negatively correlated with variables concerning political rights and public freedom (A100 and A101).
Calculating the correlation coefficients (the whole matrix is too large to present here in a table) between each of the variables discussed here in the broad category A (functioning of political institutions and civil society), the following observations are in order over and above those already noted. First, Independence of the justice system from the government (A3070) goes hand in hand with free elections (A1000) and various components of the variable, public freedom and autonomy of civil society (A101) excepting the component -respect for minorities (A1013), low proportion of media under government control (A1020) and low corruption (A3020 and A3021). It has a negative correlation with the importance of military in the political affairs of a country.
Second, public freedom and the autonomy of the civil society (freedom of press etc.) do not go well with the high importance of military and single political party. Third, respect for minorities (A1014) is highly correlated with less conflict of ethnic religious and regional nature (A2001). Finally, low corruption (high values of A3020 and A3021) goes hand in hand with respect for law (high values of A1013), independence of the justice system from the government (high values of A3070) and less importance of military stakeholders (low values of A5009).
All these observations are more or less expected and not counter-intuitive.
B. Functioning of market for goods and services
Under the broad category, the market for goods and services (B) we discuss a number of variables: Looking at the correlation matrix (see Table 3 ) we observe high positive correlation between shares of public sector in GDP in the two years 2001 and 2006 (B400 and B401) and their high correlation with administrative prices (B403). The variable, administrative business start-up formality (B300) is positively correlated with ease of market entry of new firms (B700) because of the component, de facto obstacles of an administrative nature (B7000). The variable C800 has the following further sub-components:
C8000: Openness of bank capital to foreign shareholdings; C8001: Right of establishment for foreign banks (deposit banks and investment banks); C8002: Access of foreign-owned or partly-foreign-owned firms to loans from local banks; C8003: Access of local banking firms to international bank loans; C8004: Access of local firms to international financial markets;
The variables describing various aspects of capital market functioning are correlated -less government intervention in allocation of lending and interest fixation goes hand in hand with openness to foreign capital and loans (Table 4) . More specifically it can be observed that the higher the central bank independence in practice (higher values of C4025) the lower is the government intervention in allocation of lending (higher values of C4020 to C4024). Table 4 Coefficients of correlation between selected aspects of functioning of capital market ___________________________________________________________ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- As regards the correlation between various aspects of the functioning of the labour market, it can be observed that freedom of association (D100) and trade union plurality (D101) are positively correlated; high positive correlation also exists between employment contract protection (D602) and labour courts (D603). Furthermore, freedom of association (D100) and social dialogue (right to strike etc, D700) have a very high positive correlation. Surprisingly, we find no significant correlation between the existences of high informal labour market with other aspects of the functioning of the labour market (see Table 5 ). Table 5 Coefficients of correlation between selected aspects of functioning of labour market _______________________________________________________________________ D100 D101 D400 D401 D600 D601 D602 In Table 6 we have presented selected institutional data from each category to provide a glimpse of the institutional scenario of the 70 countries covered by our study. Due to lack of space we cannot present the full institutional dataset discussed here.
D603 D701 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Institutions, Income and Growth
The At 3 digit levels we have discussed 31 variables plus 5 components of the variable concerning stakeholders. Taking into account the high correlations among the variables in each broad category (noted earlier), we are left with 7 independent variables (and 3 stakeholders) in group A (A100, A102, A103, A104, A200, A201, A302, A5000, A5002and A5003), 9 independent variables in group B (B300, B402, B403, B700, B701, B702, B703, B704and B800), one in group C (C401) and 7 independent variables in group D (D101, D400, D600, D601, D602, D603 and D701).The matrix of correlations (see Table 7 ) among PCY A100 A200 A201 A302 A307 B300 B403 C402 C800 D100 D602 these variables shows that A102 (concentration of media) has significant positive correlation with two variables, share of banking sector in private hands in 2006 (C401) and trade union plurality (D101). Deleting this variable we are left with 26 variables (twenty three 3-digit variables and three 4-digit variables). Table 7 Interactions among Various Aspects of Institutions: Correlation Matrix _________________________________________________________________ A100 A102 A103 A104 A200 A201 A302 A5000 A5002 A5003 Contd. _________________________________________________________________ Contd. An examination of the correlation matrix does not show very high correlation among these variables and none of these is highly correlated with the variables on institutions we are considering in our regression analysis.
We run a panel regression involving all the countries (63 out of 70) for which we got the relevant data over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . On the left hand side we have annual series on GDP per capita (in natural log, LPCY) or the growth of GDP (GGDP) over the period 2001-2006 and on the right hand side we have timevarying DCBY, TRDY and FDIY (all in natural log indicated by LDCBY, LTRDY and LFDIY respectively) plus time invariant variables covering different aspects of institutions (we don't have time-series data and we assume these to be almost time-invariant over the period of study).
The equation to be fitted is
where, y it is the dependent variable (LPCY or GGDP), X it β stands for a vector of time-variant independent variables (LDCBY,LTRDY and LFDIY) and Z i γ for a vector of time-invariant independent variables (covering different aspects of institutions, u i denotes the unit effect, ε it is the normal distributed error component i (=1, 2 In a cross-country analysis one crucial problem crops up due to country specific omitted variables -different countries have different histories, cultures and many institutional and/or socio-psychological factors that are not included in the analysis either due to ignorance or due to non-availability of data or a mixture of both. These omitted variables often influence the variables on the right hand side and create a bias in the estimates. So often a fixed effect (FE) model is used to eliminate the effect of these omitted variables through differencing or demeaning the data. But this procedure would eliminate all the (time-invariant) institutional variables included in our study.
A random effect model can retain these variables but cannot take into account the omitted variable bias -correlation among the variables included on the right hand side and the variables that are not included (unobserved country specific factors). One can use here Hausman-Taylor estimation strategy. The problem of this technique is that the estimated coefficients through this strategy largely vary with researchers' decision regarding which variables are endogenous and which variables are exogenous (Plümper and Troegerhis 2007) . As a way-out of this impasse, the ''fixed effects vector decomposition'' (FEVD) methodology was proposed by Plümper and Troegerhis (2007) . It is a three-stage procedure for the estimation of time-invariant and rarely changing variables in panel data models with fixed effects. The first stage of the estimator runs a fixed-effects model to obtain the fixed effects, the second stage breaks down the fixed effects into a part explained by the time-invariant and/or rarely changing variables and an error term, and the third stage re-estimates the first stage by pooled OLS including the time-invariant variables plus the error term of stage 2, which then accounts for the unexplained part of the fixed effects.
We have used this state of the art FEVD methodology widely used in political science with the aid of STATA programme. 4 We have also fitted random effect model and compare the estimates of this model with those of the FEVD model with the aid of Hausman test. This shows that FEVD model is efficient in each of the two cases.
The estimates are reported in Table 8 . AR1 Prais-Winsten transformation is used to correct for first order autocorrelation problem. The FEVD approach shows that in the case of per capita GDP (LPCY), all the estimated coefficients of the independent variables are highly significant. Looking at the signs of the estimated coefficients and the system of grading followed to generate the variables, it can be said that at cross-country panel level, higher GDP per capita is associated with (1) lower net FDI inflow relative to GDP (lower FDIY), (2) more trade openness (higher TRDY), (3) more developed banking sector (higher DCBY), (4) more citizens' political rights and better functioning of political institutions (higher A100), (5) less decentralised local governments (lower A103), (6) more decentralised tax collecting system (higher A104), (7) more internal public security (higher A200), (8) less external public security (lower A201), (9) less corruption (higher A302), (10) more influence of large domestic and foreign firms on its political affairs (higher A5000 and A5002) with less influence of big landowners (lower A5003), Interestingly if we use the annual GDP growth rate as the dependent variable (instead of LPCY) in our FEVD regression analysis we find no statistically significant relationship between institutions and growth. Not only that, none of the coefficients of other independent variables such as LFDIY, LTRDY and LDCBY is statistically significant.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
Our panel data analysis that adequately takes into account country specificity and endogeneity finds no significant link between institutions and growth on the one hand and highly significant relationship between various institutions and the level of GDP per capita on the other hand.
How do we interpret this anomalous result? It should be borne in mind that it is difficult to say about cause and effect through cross-section or very short-period panel data analysis. A causality test (such as Granger Causality test) requires a long time series data for all the variables and it is difficult (if not impossible) to get a long time series data for institutions. Without a satisfactory causality test if we assume that it can be said that the variables which are statistically significant on the right hand side are causing the variable on the left hand side, our conclusion should be that institutions matter for the state of development and not for the growth rate. We can argue that the state of development is the outcome of long-term growth and so the level of GDP per capita reflects long-term growth while annual growth rate reflects changes in the short run. It can then be concluded that institutions matter in the long run.
Our study, however, shows that not all the indicators of 'good governance' are positively correlated with the state of development. The grading mechanism of MINEFE dataset has an implicit acceptance of Washington Consensus on functioning of goods and capital market-high score for more liberal privatized market oriented institutions. At the same time it is giving high score to pro-labour institutions. So we got mixed results -in some cases existence of 'better' institutions (as indicated by high score for more of the institutions) and lower GDP per capita go together and in some cases 'worse' institutions (such as high percentage of administered pricing ) and higher GDP per capita go hand in hand. Some of our results look more like the feature of a developed state -such as the association of higher per capita GDP with lower importance of informal labour market and lower influence of big landowners. Evidently long-term development leads to changes in institutions. We have the chicken-egg problem (whether chicken come out of eggs or eggs come out of chicken). The institutions-growth link is one of mutual causation -some institutions change in the process of growth and some institutions facilitate growth 5 . For answering what types of institutions promote growth our study does not provide unequivocal support to market-friendly institutions.
